Amb motiu del tancament d'estiu, la validació de documents es reprendrà a partir del 28 d'agost de 2026. Disculpeu les molèsties.
Con motivo del cierre de verano, la validación de documentos se reanudará a partir del 28 de agosto de 2026. Disculpad las molestias
Due to the summer closure, document validation will resume starting August 28, 2026. We apologize for any inconvenience.

Taxation and Conditional Cooperation

dc.contributor.authorFrey, Bruno S., 1941-
dc.contributor.authorTorgler, Benno, 1972-
dc.date.accessioned2018-02-05T17:05:48Z
dc.date.available2018-02-05T17:05:48Z
dc.date.issued2004
dc.description.abstractWhy so many people pay their taxes, although fines and audit probability are low, has become a central question in the tax compliance literature. Concepts of Homo Economicus, endowed with a more refined motivation structure, help to shed light on the tax compliance puzzle. This paper provides empirical evidence for the relevance of conditional cooperation, using survey data from 30 European countries. The findings suggest that a higher perceived tax evasion leads to a lower tax morale, also when controlling for additional factors in a multivariate analysis.ca
dc.format.extent34 p.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/119595
dc.language.isoengca
dc.publisherInstitut d’Economia de Barcelonaca
dc.relation.isformatofReproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions
dc.relation.ispartofIEB Working Paper 2004/07
dc.relation.ispartofseries[WP E-IEB04/07]
dc.rightscc-by-nc-nd, (c) Frey et al., 2004
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessca
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.sourceIEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers
dc.subject.classificationFrau fiscalcat
dc.subject.classificationSancions tributàriescat
dc.subject.classificationExempció d'impostoscat
dc.subject.otherTax evasioneng
dc.subject.otherTax penaltieseng
dc.subject.otherTax exemptioneng
dc.titleTaxation and Conditional Cooperationca
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperca

Fitxers

Paquet original

Mostrant 1 - 1 de 1
Carregant...
Miniatura
Nom:
IEB04-07_Frey.pdf
Mida:
148.44 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format