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Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/115502
Strike one to educate one hundred: organized crime, political selection and politicians’ ability
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A central question in terms of political (self-)selection relates to the incentives leading high ability individuals to enter – or abstain from entering – into politics. In this article, we use data from Italian municipalities over the period 1985-2012 to empirically assess how changes in individuals’ expected payoffs affect political (self-)selection. Identification derives from murders of local politicians by the mafia, and indicates that such a negative shock to politicians’ expected payoffs induces a strong decrease in first-time elected politicians’ human capital. The effect is not limited to the municipality where a political murder takes place, but also extends to nearby municipalities.
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DANIELE, Gianmarco. Strike one to educate one hundred: organized crime, political selection and politicians’ ability. _IEB Working Paper 2015/37_. [consulta: 21 de gener de 2026]. [Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/115502]