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Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/216605
A Defense on the Usefulness of 'Big-G' Grounding
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Contemporary metaphysics has undergone a change of perspective due to the irruption of Grounding in discussions of metaphysical dependence.
Proponents argue that Grounding is the primitive relationship of determination underlying many of the traditionally posited idioms of metaphysical dependence.
In a recent line of scepticism Jessica Wilson has argued that the inability of the notion to be informatively effective regarding substantial matters of metaphysical
determination renders it useless in the face of theoretical work. To supply this lack of informativeness proponents must resort to the already available set of specific ‘small-g’ relations, which renders the formulation of ‘big-G’ Grounding pre- theoretically unmotivated. In response two motivations are said to remain: The priority and unity arguments. Wilson insists that neither of these motivations succeeds in establishing ‘big-G’ Grounding as theoretically useful. I argue that none of Wilson’s critiques succeeds in establishing eliminative scepticism.
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KORTABARRIA AREITIO, Markel. A Defense on the Usefulness of 'Big-G' Grounding. _Metaphysica_. 2022. Vol. 24, núm. 1, pàgs. 147-174. [consulta: 30 de gener de 2026]. ISSN: 1437-2053. [Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/216605]