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IEB14-06_Cubel.pdf (905.51 KB)

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Working paper

Publication date

2014

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cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Cubel et al., 2014
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/115513

Difference-form group contests

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Abstract

Contests are situations in which a set of agents compete for a valuable object, rent or award. The present paper analyzes difference-form group contests, that is, contests fought among groups and where their probability of victory depends on the difference of their effective efforts. First, we show that the non-existence of pure-strategy equilibria and the monopolization results obtained in previous analysis of difference-form contests rest critically on the assumption of a linear cost of effort. Under exponential costs, we show that pure strategy equilibria exist in a large set of cases and that more tan one group can expend positive effort in equilibrium. Second, we show that inequality of valuations of victory within groups hinders their chances of prevailing in the contest. If possible; members may find beneficial to engage in progressive redistribution within their group.

Subject

Concursos, Teoria de distribucions (Anàlisi funcional)

Subject (English)

Contests, Theory of distributions (Functional analysis)

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IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers

Citation

CUBEL, Maria and SÁNCHEZ-PAGÉS, Santiago. Difference-form group contests. IEB Working Paper 2014/06. [consulted: 19 of August of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/115513

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