Carregant...
Fitxers
Tipus de document
ArticleVersió
Versió acceptadaData de publicació
Llicència de publicació
Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/199580
Firm behavior during an epidemic
Títol de la revista
Director/Tutor
ISSN de la revista
Títol del volum
Recurs relacionat
Resum
We derive a model in which firms operate in an epidemic environment and internalize infections among their employees in the workplace. The model is calibrated to fit the moments of the Covid-19 epidemic. We show that firms have incentives to fight against infections and can do so very effectively by increasing teleworking and rotating employees between on-site work, teleworking, and leave. The fight against infections in firms flattens the aggregate infections curve. Subsidies to teleworking reduce infections and save lives. Subsidies to sick leave reduce the cost of sick workers and raise workplace infections. Firms delay and weaken the fight against infections during economic downturns. We also consider the problem of a government that values output and lives. We show that the government prefers to severely restrict the epidemic by tolerating short-term output losses when it has a high valuation of life
Matèries (anglès)
Citació
Col·leccions
Citació
BROTHERHOOD, Luiz, JERBASHIAN, Vahagn. Firm behavior during an epidemic. _Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control_. 2023. Vol. 147, núm. 104594, pàgs. 1-17. [consulta: 20 de gener de 2026]. ISSN: 0165-1889. [Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/199580]