Carregant...
Tipus de document
Document de treballData de publicació
Llicència de publicació
Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/225806
Fiscal policy and politicians’ term length
Títol de la revista
Director/Tutor
ISSN de la revista
Títol del volum
Recurs relacionat
Resum
This paper investigates the causal effect of the term length of political executives on economic policy outcomes. To establish causality, we exploit the staggered adoption of four-year terms for governors across US states, using data for the period 1937–2008. We find that increasing governors’ tenure in office from two years to four years reduced state expenditures and revenues by approximately 0.3–0.5 percentage points of GDP. The effect on state finances is primarily driven by a reduction of current spending and grants from the federal government, and it is concentrated in states where the incumbent governor expects fierce competition in the next election. Lastly, we discuss the implications of longer terms for macroeconomic stabilization, political budget cycles, and intergovernmental resource allocation.
Matèries
Matèries (anglès)
Citació
Citació
CIPULLO, Davide, FRANZONI, Federico, KLARIN, Jonas. Fiscal policy and politicians’ term length. _IEB Working Paper 2025/13_. [consulta: 23 de gener de 2026]. [Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/225806]