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2020-03

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cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier, 2020
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/154537

Assortative multisided assignment games: the extreme core points

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Abstract

We analyze assortative multisided assignment games, following Sherstyuk (1999) and Martínez-de-Albéniz et al. (2019). In them players' abilities are complementary across types (i.e. supermodular), and also the output of the essential coalitions is increasing depending on types. We study the extreme core points and show a simple mechanism to compute all of them. In this way we describe the whole core. This mechanism works from the original data array and the maximum number of extreme core points is obtained.

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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.001

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Teoria de jocs, Teoria de conjunts, Lògica matemàtica, Presa de decisions

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Game theory, Set theory, Mathematical logic, Decision making

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Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

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MARTÍNEZ DE ALBÉNIZ, F. Javier, RAFELS, Carles and YBERN, Neus. Assortative multisided assignment games: the extreme core points. Games and Economic Behavior. 2020. Vol. 120, num. March, pags. 144-153. ISSN 0899-8256. [consulted: 10 of October of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/154537

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