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Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116977
Soft budgets and local borrowing regulation in a dynamic decentralized leadership model with saving and free mobility
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This paper considers a simple dynamic decentralized leadership model with local borrowing and regional productivity enhancing investment. The central government is benevolent but cannot commit. The local governments strategically act while accounting for the ex post motive of the central government. We then investigate inefficiency in the subgame perfect equilibrium. We analyze the effect of central control on local borrowings. It is revealed that the central control is of no use. The model is extended to the case with residential mobility which gives different policy implications.
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AKAI, Nobuo, SATO, Motohiro. Soft budgets and local borrowing regulation in a dynamic decentralized leadership model with saving and free mobility. _IEB Working Paper 2009/20_. [consulta: 23 de gener de 2026]. [Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116977]