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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/188635
Jocs amb informació incompleta: jocs bayesians i subhastes
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[en] In this work we introduce the sealed-bid auction theory, and we compute its equilibrium when values are private and affiliated. Then we compare the seller’s expected revenue of first and second price auctions under different scenarios. Finally, we simulate an auction and check that the Revenue equivalence holds when values are uniformly distributed on [0,1].
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Treballs Finals de Grau de Matemàtiques, Facultat de Matemàtiques, Universitat de Barcelona, Any: 2022, Director: Josep Vives i Santa Eulàlia
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BATLLE MASMIQUEL, Laura. Jocs amb informació incompleta: jocs bayesians i subhastes. [consulted: 15 of August of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/188635