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2018-10

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Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/127321

Overlapping political budget cycle

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Recurs relacionat

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0582-9

Resum

We advance the literature on political budget cycles by testing for cycles in expenditures for elections to the legislative and the executive branches. Using municipal data, we identify cycles independently for the two branches, evaluate the effects of overlaps, and account for general year effects. We find sizable effects on expenditures before legislative elections and even larger effects before joint elections to the legislature and the office of mayor. In the case of coincident elections, we show that it is important whether the incumbent chief executive seeks reelection. To account for the potential endogeneity of that decision, we apply an IV approach using age and pension eligibility rules.

Matèries

Eleccions, Despesa pública, Eleccions locals

Matèries (anglès)

Elections, Public expenditures, Local elections

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Col·leccions

Articles publicats en revistes (Economia)

Citació

FOREMNY, Dirk, FREIER, Ronny, MOESSINGER, Marc-daniel, YETER, Mustafa. Overlapping political budget cycle. _Public Choice_. 2018. Vol. 177, núm. 1-2, pàgs. 1-27. [consulta: 24 de gener de 2026]. ISSN: 0048-5829. [Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/127321]

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