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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/216368
Somatosensation and the First Person
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Abstract
Experientialism about the sense of bodily ownership is the view that there is something
it is like to feel a body as one’s own. In this paper I argue for a particular experientialist
thesis. I first present a puzzle about the relation between bodily awareness
and self-consciousness, and introduce a somewhat underappreciated view on the
sense of bodily ownership, Implicit Reflexivity, that points us in the right direction
as to how to address this puzzle. I argue that Implicit Reflexivity, however, does
not provide a full solution to the puzzle. I then introduce a novel view on the sense
of bodily ownership that inherits a central tenet, Reflexivity, from the above view,
without having its flaws. According to Reflexivity, the sense of bodily ownership
consists in the reflexive character of bodily sensations, namely in the fact that bodily
sensations have experience-dependent properties as part of their content. Cashed out
this way, Reflexivity is an attractive way of explicating the notion that bodily sensations
are experiences of the body as subject. Reflexivity also highlights a central, but
so far neglected, connection between the sense of bodily ownership and the sense of
experience ownership.
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SERRAHIMA BALIUS, Carlota. Somatosensation and the First Person. Review of Philosophy and Psychology. 2024. Vol. 15, num. 51-68. ISSN 1878-5158. [consulted: 20 of August of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/216368