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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/199103
Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept
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In this paper I aim to illuminate the significance of thought insertion for debates about the first-person concept. My starting point is the often-voiced contention that thought insertion might challenge the thesis that introspection-based self-ascriptions of psychological properties are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person concept. In the first part of the paper I explain what a thought insertion-based counterexample to this immunity thesis should be like. I then argue that various thought insertion-involving scenarios do not give rise to successful counterexamples to the immunity of the target class of self-ascriptions. In the second part of the paper I turn to defend a Metasemantic Explanation of why the immunity thesis holds. The Metasemantic Explanation rests on a referencefixing story about the mental 'I' whose key contention is that introspective impressions play an essential role in fixing its reference. It is part of my argument in favour of the proposed reference-fixing story, as well as of the Metasemantic Explanation, that they respect the paradigmatic features of self-ascriptions of inserted thoughts.
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PALMIRA, Michele. Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept. Philosophical Studies. 2020. Vol. 177, num. 12, pags. 3833-3860. ISSN 0031-8116. [consulted: 13 of June of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/199103