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2018-10-19

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Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/146038

Inquiry and The Doxastic Attitudes

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Recurs relacionat

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01955-3

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In this paper I take up the question of the nature of the doxastic attitudes we entertain while inquiring into some matter. Relying on a distinction between two stages of open inquiry, I urge to acknowledge the existence of a distinctive attitude of cognitive inclination towards a proposition qua answer to the question one is inquiring into. I call this attitude "hypothesis". Hypothesis, I argue, is a sui generis doxastic attitude which differs, both functionally and normatively, from suspended judgement, full belief, credences, and acceptance. In closing, I point to the epistemological significance of hypothesis. More specifically, I contend that holding an attitude of hypothesis enables us to respond rationally to peer disagreement, and I suggest that such an attitude offers a suitable articulation of the view, originally put forward by Philip Kitcher, that cognitive diversity in inquiry has epistemic benefits.

Matèries

Teoria del coneixement, Lògica

Matèries (anglès)

Theory of knowledge, Logic

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Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)
Publicacions de projectes de recerca finançats per la UE

Citació

PALMIRA, Michele. Inquiry and The Doxastic Attitudes. Synthese. 2018. Vol. 1-47. ISSN 0039-7857. [consulted: 2 of July of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/146038

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