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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/223681
Seeing Wrongness
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This paper examines the plausibility of an attention-based version of moral perceptualism (amp). According to amp, our perception of moral properties is characterized by perceptual attentional patterns that reflect a sensitivity to morally salient features. First, I argue that the explanation for the empirical evidence offered to support amp primarily hinges on cognitive processes rather than perceptual ones. Second, while I acknowledge the critical importance of attention in recognizing moral properties, I contend that we must expand amp’s explanatory scope to address the question of what drives this attention. I propose an account of our (in)sensitivity to wrongness that builds on amp’s core statement. In this account, the notion of salience structure of information, defined by the varying accessibility of both perceptual and cognitive representations, plays a central explanatory role.
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TORIBIO MATEAS, Josefa. Seeing Wrongness. Journal of Moral Philosophy. 2024. Vol. 22, num. 3-4, pags. 314-335. ISSN 1740-4681. [consulted: 11 of June of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/223681