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cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier, 2020
Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/164733

Do national political parties matter? Evidence from Italian municipalities

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Recently several countries have experienced a drop in popularity of national political parties, accompanied by the success of independent movements (e.g. 'Civic Lists' in Italy). I exploit the success of 'Civic Lists' in Italian municipalities and use them as a comparison group for party-affiliated politicians, to test whether national parties affect fiscal discipline. Using a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), I show that party-affiliated mayors are more fiscally responsible: they run lower deficits, accumulate less debt and reduce expenditures. The effect is significant only for municipalities not constrained by fiscal rules. This suggests that national parties act as a substitute for fiscal rules in constraining politicians. Besides, I provide evidence that the discipline of party-affiliated politicians is linked to better career prospects: party-affiliated mayors have a higher probability of being re-elected and better chances of being promoted to higher levels of government. Alternative stories find less support in the data.

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GAMALERIO, Matteo. Do national political parties matter? Evidence from Italian municipalities. European Journal of Political Economy. 2020. Vol. 63, núm. 101862. ISSN 0176-2680. [consulta: 8 de maig de 2026]. Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/164733

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