Externalities and the (Pre)nucleolus in Cooperative Games

dc.contributor.authorÁlvarez-Mozos, Mikel
dc.contributor.authorEhlers, Lars
dc.date.accessioned2024-02-02T12:23:23Z
dc.date.available2024-02-02T12:23:23Z
dc.date.issued2024-03-01
dc.date.updated2024-02-02T12:23:23Z
dc.description.abstractIn most economic applications of cooperative games, externalities prevail: the worth of a coalition depends on how the other players are organized. We show that there is a unique natural way of extending the prenucleolus to games with coalitional externalities. This is in contrast to the Shapley value and the core for which many different extensions have been proposed.
dc.format.extent6 p.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.idgrec741726
dc.identifier.issn0165-4896
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/207069
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherElsevier B.V.
dc.relation.isformatofReproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.003
dc.relation.ispartofMathematical Social Sciences, 2024, vol. 128, num.March, p. 10-15
dc.relation.urihttps://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.003
dc.rightscc-by (c) Elsevier B.V., 2024
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/*
dc.sourceArticles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)
dc.subject.classificationJocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)
dc.subject.classificationEstadística matemàtica
dc.subject.classificationGeometria algebraica
dc.subject.classificationTeoria d'operadors
dc.subject.otherCooperative games (Mathematics)
dc.subject.otherMathematical statistics
dc.subject.otherAlgebraic geometry
dc.subject.otherOperator theory
dc.titleExternalities and the (Pre)nucleolus in Cooperative Games
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion

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