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2024-03-01

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cc-by (c) Elsevier B.V., 2024
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/207069

Externalities and the (Pre)nucleolus in Cooperative Games

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.003

Abstract

In most economic applications of cooperative games, externalities prevail: the worth of a coalition depends on how the other players are organized. We show that there is a unique natural way of extending the prenucleolus to games with coalitional externalities. This is in contrast to the Shapley value and the core for which many different extensions have been proposed.

Subject

Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica), Estadística matemàtica, Geometria algebraica, Teoria d'operadors

Subject (English)

Cooperative games (Mathematics), Mathematical statistics, Algebraic geometry, Operator theory

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Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

Citation

ÁLVAREZ-MOZOS, Mikel and EHLERS, Lars. Externalities and the (Pre)nucleolus in Cooperative Games. Mathematical Social Sciences. 2024. Vol. 128, num. March, pags. 10-15. ISSN 0165-4896. [consulted: 10 of August of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/207069

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