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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/165620
Names, predicates, and the object–property distinction
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Proper names and predicates are different kinds of expressions, with different semantic functions. Names refer and predicates attribute properties or classify things into kinds. To some of us that is almost a platitude. Nevertheless, some philosophers contend that the difference is just apparent, and they have endorsed predicativist views advocating that names are really predicates and should be treated as such. The purpose of this paper is to argue against predicativism. However, the chapter will not engage the specific arguments offered by proponents of the view. Rather, it will argue that the proposal to treat proper names as predicates is wrong for semantic reasons that are grounded in metaphysical and conceptual considerations.
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MARTÍ, Genoveva. Names, predicates, and the object–property distinction. Capítol del llibre: María de Ponte and Kepa Korta. 2017. Reference and Representation in Thought and Language. Oxford University Press. ISBN: 9780198714217. ISBN-13: 9780198714217. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198714217.003.0002.. [consulted: 8 of August of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/165620