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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/147399
Hybrid Dispositionalism and the Law
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Dworkin’s famous argument from legal disagreements poses a problem for legal positivism by undermining the idea that the law can be (just) the result of the practice and attitudes of norm-applying officials. In recent work, the chapter author argued that a hybrid contextualist theory paired with a dispositional theory of value—a hybrid dispositionalism, for short—offers the resources to respond to similar disagreement- based arguments in other evaluative and normative domains. This chapter claims that the theory the author advocates can extend to legal statements and disputes, and shares some important features with Toh’s (2011) idea that legal statements express shared acceptance of norms. The chapter proposes that a contextualist semantics for legal statements paired with the pragmatic communication of implicatures that express shared acceptances of norms, achieves the same goal that Toh aims at.
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MARQUES, Teresa. Hybrid Dispositionalism and the Law. Capítol 12 del llibre: David Plunkett. Scott J. Shapiro. Vol. Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence, num. February 2019. [consulted: 13 of June of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/147399