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Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/229431
The case for lobbying transparency
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Lobbying transparency regulations are hailed as a potential solution to concerns about the excessive influence of special interest groups (SIGs) over policy-making. I study how these regulations shape strategic interactions between voters, politicians and SIGs. By clarifying the process through which a policy was implemented, lobbying transparency helps voters hold politicians accountable and control the influence of SIGs. Ex-post, conditional on access, SIGs prefer to operate without lobbying transparency. Ex-ante, they may benefit from lobbying transparency because it redirect the voters’ blame towards politicians. Ultimately however, lobbying transparency standards may hurt the electoral prospects of politicians and thus risk never being implemented, potentially explaining why voters’ demand for it remains unanswered.
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ZERBINI, Antoine. The case for lobbying transparency. IEB Working Paper 2026/04. [consulted: 23 of May of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/229431