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Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116646
Can lower tax rates be bought? Business rent-seeking and tax competition among U.S. States
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The standard model of strategic tax competition assumes that government policymakers are perfectly benevolent. We depart from this assumption by allowing policymakers to be influenced by the rent-seeking behavior of businesses. Campaign contributions may affect tax competition and enhance or retard the mobility of capital across jurisdictions. Based on a panel of 48 U.S. states and unique data on business campaign contributions, we find that contributions have a significant direct effect on tax policy, the economic value of a $1 business campaign contribution is nearly $4, the slope of the tax reaction function is negative, and the empirical results are sensitive to state effects.
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CHIRINKO, Robert s., WILSON, Daniel j.. Can lower tax rates be bought? Business rent-seeking and tax competition among U.S. States. _IEB Working Paper 2010/02_. [consulta: 23 de gener de 2026]. [Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116646]