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2018

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Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/149086

Retractions

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Intuitions about retractions have been used to motivate truth relativism about certain types of claims. Among these figure epistemic modals, knowledge attributions, or personal taste claims. On MacFarlane's prominent relativist proposal, sentences like 'the ice cream might be in the freezer' or 'Pocoyo is funny' are only assigned a truth-value relative to contexts of utterance and contexts of assessment. Retractions play a crucial role in the argument for assessment-relativism. A retraction of a past assertion is supposed to be mandatory whenever the asserted sentence is not true at the context of use and the context of assessment. If retractions were not obligatory in these conditions, there would be no normative difference between assessment-relativism and contextualism. The main goal of this paper is to undermine the claim that retractions reveal this normative difference. To this effect, the paper offers a review of three important objections to the obligatoriness of retractions. Taken together, these objections make a strong case against the alleged support that retractions give to assessment-relativism. The objections are moreover supported by recent experimental results that are also discussed. This will satisfy a further goal, which is to undermine the idea that there is a constitutive retraction rule. The paper also discusses two ways to understand what such a rule would be constitutive of, and concludes with a discussion of how to describe what retractions are.

Matèries

Filosofia del llenguatge, Contextualisme (Filosofia), Relativisme, Modalitat (Lingüística)

Matèries (anglès)

Philosophy of language, Contextualism (Philosophy), Relativity, Modality (Linguistics)

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Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)

Citació

MARQUES, Teresa. Retractions. _Synthese_. 2018. Vol. 195, núm. 3335-3359. [consulta: 30 de gener de 2026]. ISSN: 0039-7857. [Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/149086]

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