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IEB18-04_Cavalcanti+Daniele+Galletta.pdf (1.1 MB)

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Working paper

Publication date

2018

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cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Cavalcanti et al., 2018
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/121338

Popularity shocks and political selection

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Abstract

We observe that popularity shocks are crucial for electoral accountability beyond their effects on voters’ behaviors. By focusing on Brazilian politics, we show that the disclosure of audit reports on the (mis)use of federal funds by local administrators affects the type of candidates who stand for election. When the audit finds low levels of corruption, the parties supporting the incumbent select less-educated candidates. On the contrary, parties pick more-educated candidates when the audit reveals a high level of corruption. These effects are stronger in municipalities that have easier access to local media.

Subject

Partits polítics, Corrupció política

Subject (English)

Political parties, Political corruption

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IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers

Citation

CAVALCANTI, Francisco, DANIELE, Gianmarco and GALLETTA, Sergio. Popularity shocks and political selection. IEB Working Paper 2018/04. [consulted: 10 of August of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/121338

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