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2023-07-01

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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/199581

Income-Based Affirmative Action in College Admissions Acció afirmativa basada en la renda en l'admissió a la universitat

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https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead016

Abstract

We study whether college admissions should implement quotas for lower-income applicants. We develop an overlapping-generation model and calibrate it to data from Brazil, where such a policy is widely implemented. In our model, parents choose how much to invest in their child's education, thereby increasing both human capital and likelihood of college admission. We find that, in the long run, the optimal income-based affirmative action increases welfare and aggregate output. It improves the pool of admitted students, but distorts pre-college educational investments. The welfare-maximising policy benefits lower- to middle-income applicants with income-based quotas, while higher-income applicants face fiercer competition in college admissions. The optimal policy reduces intergenerational persistence of earnings by 5.7% and makes nearly 80% of households better off.

Subject

Relacions intergeneracionals, Proves d'accés a la universitat, Planificació educativa

Subject (English)

Intergenerational relations, Entrance examinations for universities, Educational planning

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Articles publicats en revistes (Economia)

Citation

BROTHERHOOD, Luiz, HERSKOVIC, Bernard and RAMOS, João. Income-Based Affirmative Action in College Admissions Acció afirmativa basada en la renda en l'admissió a la universitat. The Economic Journal. 2023. Vol. 133, num. 653, pags. 1810-1845. ISSN 0013-0133. [consulted: 8 of June of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/199581

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