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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/146689
An agreeable collusive equilibrium in differential games with asymmetric players
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We study a class of collusive equilibria in differential games with asymmetric players discounting the future at different rates. For such equilibria, at each moment, weights of players can depend on the state of the system. To fix them, we propose using a bargaining procedure according to which players can bargain again at every future moment. By choosing as threat point the feedback noncooperative outcome, the corresponding solution, if it exists, is agreeable. An exhaustible resource game illustrates the results.
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CASTAÑER, Anna, MARÍN SOLANO, Jesús and RIBAS MARÍ, Carme. An agreeable collusive equilibrium in differential games with asymmetric players. Operations Research Letters. 2020. Vol. 48, num. 1, pags. 4-8. ISSN 0167-6377. [consulted: 15 of November of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/146689