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2016-12-21

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cc-by-nc-nd (c) Hoefer, Carl, 2016
Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116252

Objective Chance: Not Propensity, Maybe Determinism

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Recurs relacionat

https://doi.org/10.20416/lsrsps.v3i1.603

Resum

One currently popular view about the nature of objective probabilities, or objective chances, is that they - or some of them, at least - are primitive features of the physical world, not reducible to anything else nor explicable in terms of frequencies, degrees of belief, or anything else. In this paper I explore the question of what the semantic content of primitive chance claims could be. Every attempt I look at to supply such content either comes up empty-handed, or begs important questions against the skeptic who doubts the meaningfulness of primitive chance claims. In the second half of the paper I show that, by contrast, there are clear, and clearly contentful, ways to understand objective chance claims if we ground them on deterministic physical underpinnings.

Matèries

Filosofia de la ciència, Determinisme (Filosofia), Física, Metafísica, Probabilitats

Matèries (anglès)

Philosophy of science, Determinism (Philosophy), Physics, Metaphysics, Probabilities

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Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)

Citació

HOEFER, Carl. Objective Chance: Not Propensity, Maybe Determinism. Lato Sensu. Revue de la Société de Philosophie des Sciences. 2016. Vol. 3, num. 1, pags. 30-42. ISSN 2295-8029. [consulted: 22 of May of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116252

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