Articulation and Liars

dc.contributor.authorOms Sardans, Sergi, 1974-
dc.date.accessioned2026-01-16T14:39:18Z
dc.date.available2026-01-16T14:39:18Z
dc.date.issued2017-11-27
dc.date.updated2026-01-16T14:39:18Z
dc.description.abstractJamie Tappenden was one of the first authors to entertain the possibility of a common treatment for the Liar and the Sorites paradoxes. In order to deal with these two paradoxes he proposed using the Strong Kleene semantic scheme. This strategy left unexplained our tendency to regard as true certain sentences which, according to this semantic scheme, should lack truth value. Tappenden tried to solve this problem by using a new speech act, articulation. Unlike assertion, which implies truth, articulation only implies non-falsity. In this paper I argue that Tappenden’s strategy cannot be successfully applied to truth and the Liar.
dc.format.extent17 p.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.idgrec677954
dc.identifier.issn0873-626X
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/225633
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherUniversidade de Lisboa
dc.relation.isformatofReproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0011
dc.relation.ispartofDisputatio, 2017, vol. 9, num.46, p. 383-399
dc.relation.urihttps://doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0011
dc.rightscc-by-nc-nd (c) Oms, S, 2017
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subject.classificationParadoxa
dc.subject.classificationVaguetat (Filosofia)
dc.subject.classificationVeritat i mentida
dc.subject.otherParadox
dc.subject.otherVagueness (Philosophy)
dc.subject.otherTruthfulness and falsehood
dc.titleArticulation and Liars
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

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