Tipus de document
Document de treballData de publicació
Llicència de publicació
Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/115362
Empirical evidence on tax cooperation between sub-central administrations [WP-IEB]
Títol de la revista
Director/Tutor
ISSN de la revista
Títol del volum
Recurs relacionat
Resum
The literature on horizontal tax interdependence pays limited attention to interactions in administrative policies, although they can play a large role in determining the amount of tax revenues collected. We investigate the incentives for sub-central tax authority cooperation in a decentralized context, with the aim of identifying the determinants of that cooperation. Our results are congruent with standard theory; in particular, the existence of reciprocity is essential for sharing tax information, but there is sluggishness in this process, which is partly the result of the short-sighted behaviour of tax authorities influenced by budget constraints. Hence, this is good news for the functioning of a decentralized tax administration, as in the medium-long run the gains to be made from sharing tax information are achieved.
Matèries
Matèries (anglès)
Citació
Citació
DURÁN CABRÉ, José María, ESTELLER MORÉ, Alejandro i SALVADORI, Luca. Empirical evidence on tax cooperation between sub-central administrations [WP-IEB]. IEB Working Paper 2015/07. [consulta: 8 de maig de 2026]. Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/115362