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Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/115362
Empirical evidence on tax cooperation between sub-central administrations [WP-IEB]
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The literature on horizontal tax interdependence pays limited attention to interactions in administrative policies, although they can play a large role in determining the amount of tax revenues collected. We investigate the incentives for sub-central tax authority cooperation in a decentralized context, with the aim of identifying the determinants of that cooperation. Our results are congruent with standard theory; in particular, the existence of reciprocity is essential for sharing tax information, but there is sluggishness in this process, which is partly the result of the short-sighted behaviour of tax authorities influenced by budget constraints. Hence, this is good news for the functioning of a decentralized tax administration, as in the medium-long run the gains to be made from sharing tax information are achieved.
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DURÁN CABRÉ, José maría, ESTELLER MORÉ, Alejandro, SALVADORI, Luca. Empirical evidence on tax cooperation between sub-central administrations [WP-IEB]. _IEB Working Paper 2015/07_. [consulta: 9 de abril de 2026]. [Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/115362]