Files

255785.pdf (387.83 KB)

Document type

Article

Version

Accepted version

Publication date

2024-02-01

All rights reserved

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/207494

Many-to-One Intentionalism

Journal Title

Authors

Director/Tutor

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Related resource

https://doi.org/https://doi-org.sire.ub.edu/10.5840/jphil202412125

Abstract

Intentionalism is the view that perceptual phenomenology depends on perceptual content. The aim of this paper is to make explicit an ambiguity in usual formulations of intentionalism, and to argue in favor of one way to disambiguate it. It concerns whether perceptual phenomenology depends on the content of one and only one representation (often construed as being identical to a certain perceptual experience), or instead depends on a collection of many different representations, throughout the perceptual system. We argue in favor of the latter option. Intentionalism so conceived can make better sense of contemporary neuroscience of perception, and is better equipped to confront several influential objections to traditional intentionalism.

Subject

Percepció, Intencionalitat (Filosofia), Filosofia de la ment

Subject (English)

Perception, Intentionality (Philosophy), Philosophy of mind

Citation

Collections

Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)

Citation

MARTÍNEZ, Manolo and NANAY, Bence. Many-to-One Intentionalism. The Journal of Philosophy. 2024. Vol. 121, num. 2, pags. 89-107. ISSN 0022-362X. [consulted: 8 of June of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/207494

Export metadata

JSON - METS

Share record