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IEB10-14_Calabrese+Epple.pdf (617.47 KB)

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Document de treball

Data de publicació

2010

Llicència de publicació

cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Calabrese et al., 2010
Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116658

On the political economy of tax límits

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We study the political economy of state limitations on the taxing powers of local governments, investigating the effects of such restriction on housing markets, community composition, and types of taxes and expenditures undertaken by local governments. We characterize equilibrium when voters choose values of multiple policy (tax and expenditure) instruments, finding that tax limitations have very substantial effects on housing prices and the composition of communities. Political support for tax limits comes from suburban voters and from a subset of central-city voters. Support for tax limits come even from residents of communities that are not constrained by the limits.

Recurs relacionat

Matèries

Dret fiscal, Distribució de la renda, Béns públics

Matèries (anglès)

Tax law, Income distribution, Public goods

Citació

Col·leccions

IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers

Citació

CALABRESE, Stephen and EPPLE, Dennis. On the political economy of tax límits. IEB Working Paper 2010/14. [consulted: 5 of October of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116658

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