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cc-by-nc-nd (c)  José Martínez-Fernández et al., 2024
Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/230907

The many faces of the Liar Paradox

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The Liar Paradox is a classic argument that creates a contradiction by reflection on a sentence that attributes falsity to itself: ‘this sentence is false’. In our paper we will discuss the ways in which the Liar sentence (and its paradoxical argument) can be represented in first-order logic. The key to the representation is to use first-order logic to model a selfreferential language. We will also discuss several related sentences, like the Liar cycles, the empirical versions of the Liar and the Truth teller sentences.

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MARTÍNEZ FERNÁNDEZ, José and OMS SARDANS, Sergi. The many faces of the Liar Paradox. Principia: an international journal of epistemology. 2024. Vol. 21, num. 1, pags. 15-21. ISSN 1414-4247. [consulted: 27 of July of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/230907

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