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2018-06-01

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cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2018
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/199370

On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games

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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.03.022

Abstract

We study a special three-sided matching game, the so-called supplier-firm-buyer game, in which buyers and sellers (suppliers) trade indirectly through middlemen (firms). Stuart (1997) showed that all supplier-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and Maschler, 1967), and also with the Mas-Colell bargaining set (Mas-Colell, 1989).

Subject

Negociació, Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica), Teoria de jocs

Subject (English)

Negotiation, Cooperative games (Mathematics), Game theory

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Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

Citation

ATAY, Ata and SOLYMOSI, Tamás. On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games. Economics Letters. 2018. Vol. 167, num. 99-103. ISSN 0165-1765. [consulted: 18 of August of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/199370

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