On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games

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dc.contributor.authorAtay, Ata
dc.contributor.authorSolymosi, Tamás
dc.date.accessioned2023-06-16T11:56:08Z
dc.date.available2023-06-16T11:56:08Z
dc.date.issued2018-06-01
dc.date.updated2023-06-16T11:56:08Z
dc.description.abstractWe study a special three-sided matching game, the so-called supplier-firm-buyer game, in which buyers and sellers (suppliers) trade indirectly through middlemen (firms). Stuart (1997) showed that all supplier-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and Maschler, 1967), and also with the Mas-Colell bargaining set (Mas-Colell, 1989).
dc.format.extent5 p.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.idgrec716841
dc.identifier.issn0165-1765
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/199370
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherElsevier B.V.
dc.relation.isformatofVersió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.03.022
dc.relation.ispartofEconomics Letters, 2018, vol. 167, p. 99-103
dc.relation.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.03.022
dc.rightscc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2018
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.sourceArticles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)
dc.subject.classificationNegociació
dc.subject.classificationJocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)
dc.subject.classificationTeoria de jocs
dc.subject.otherNegotiation
dc.subject.otherCooperative games (Mathematics)
dc.subject.otherGame theory
dc.titleOn bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion

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