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IEB09-33_Joanis.pdf (774.5 KB)

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Document de treball

Data de publicació

2009

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cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Joanis, 2009
Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116993

Sharing the blame? Local electoral accountability and centralized school finance in California

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Resum

While electoral accountability should be stronger when responsibilities are clearly assigned to one political office, the involvement of higher tiers of government is often associated with policies specifically designed to improve local accountability. This paper investigates the impact of centralization on local electoral accountability in the context of California’s school finance system. Results show that voters are responsive to differences in dropout rates and pupil-teacher ratios, and that incumbents are less likely to be reelected when a district’s degree of centralization is high. The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 appears to have sharpened local electoral accountability.

Matèries

Descentralització administrativa, Finançament, Economia de l'educació, Eleccions

Matèries (anglès)

Decentralization in government, Funding, Economy of the education, Elections

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Col·leccions

IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers

Citació

JOANIS, Marcelin. Sharing the blame? Local electoral accountability and centralized school finance in California. _IEB Working Paper 2009/33_. [consulta: 14 de gener de 2026]. [Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116993]

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