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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/146137
Disagreement, Credences, and Outright Belief
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This paper addresses a largely neglected question in ongoing debates over disagreement: what is the relation, if any, between disagreements involving credences (call them credal disagreements) and disagreements involving outright beliefs (call them full disagreements)? The first part of the paper offers some desiderata for an adequate account of credal and full disagreement. The second part of the paper argues that both phenomena can be subsumed under a schematic definition which goes as follows: A and B disagree if and only if the accuracy conditions of A's doxastic attitude are such that, if they were fulfilled, this would ipso facto make B's doxastic attitude inaccurate, or vice‐versa.
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PALMIRA, Michele. Disagreement, Credences, and Outright Belief. Ratio. 2018. Vol. 31, num. 2, pags. 179-196. ISSN 0034-0006. [consulted: 6 of June of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/146137