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2020-08

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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/171456

Monotonicity and Weighted Prenucleoli: A Characterization Without Consistency

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Abstract

A solution on a set of transferable utility (TU) games satisfies strong aggregate monotonicity (SAM) if every player can improve when the grand coalition becomes richer. It satisfies equal surplus division (ESD) if the solution allows the players to improve equally. We show that the set of weight systems generating weighted prenucleoli that satisfy SAM is open, which implies that for weight systems close enough to any regular system, the weighted prenucleolus satisfies SAM (...)

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https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2019.1022

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Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica), Teoria de jocs

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Cooperative games (Mathematics), Game theory

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Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

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CALLEJA, Pere, LLERENA GARRÉS, Francesc and SUDHÖLTER, Peter. Monotonicity and Weighted Prenucleoli: A Characterization Without Consistency. Mathematics of Operations Research. 2020. Vol. 45, num. 3, pags. 1056-1068. ISSN 0364-765X. [consulted: 11 of October of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/171456

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