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Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/216475
Believing for a Reason is (at Least) Nearly Self-Intimating
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[eng] This paper concerns a specifc epistemic feature of believing for a reason (e.g.,
believing that it will rain on the basis of the grey clouds outside). It has commonly
been assumed that our access to such facts about ourselves is akin in all relevant
respects to our access to why other people hold their beliefs. Further, discussion
of self-intimation—that we are necessarily in a position to know when we are in
certain conditions—has centred largely around mental states. In contrast to both
assumptions, this paper argues that believing for a reason is (at least) very nearly
self-intimating: necessarily, if a subject believes that q for the reason that p, then, provided relevant conceptual and rational capacities, she is in a position to form a
justifed true belief that she believes that q for the reason that p. We should think this on the basis of the role that believing for a reason plays from the subjects’ perspective, and in particular, the way in which it intellegises one’s belief.
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KEELING, Sophie. Believing for a Reason is (at Least) Nearly Self-Intimating. _Erkenntnis. An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy_. 2024. Vol. 89, núm. 1, pàgs. 241-260. [consulta: 6 de desembre de 2025]. ISSN: 0165-0106. [Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/216475]