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IR09-022_Bel-Elias.pdf (113.63 KB)

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Working paper

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2009

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cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Bel et al., 2009
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/61504

Institutional Determinants of Military Spending

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Abstract

Drawing on a database for 1988-2006 containing information on 157 countries, we investigate the effects on military spending of government form, electoral rules, concentration of parliamentary parties, and ideology. From an OLS regression on pooled data, our results show that presidential democracies spend more than parliamentary systems on defense, whereas the presence of a plurality voting system will reduce the defense burden. Our findings suggest that, in contrast to theoretical predictions in the literature, institutions do not have the same impact on the provision of all public goods. We present as well evidence regarding the effect of ideology on defense spending.

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Política militar, Assistència militar, Partits polítics, Despesa pública

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Military policy, Military assistance, Political parties, Public expenditures

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Documents de treball (Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública (IREA))

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BEL I QUERALT, Germà and ELIAS MORENO, Ferran. Institutional Determinants of Military Spending. IREA – Working Papers. 2009. Vol.  IR09/22. ISSN 2014-1254. [consulted: 15 of June of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/61504

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