Cartels, board gender composition and gender quotas

Abstract

Cartel busting often results in the restructuring of boards of directors, presumably to remove individuals (both executive and non-executive members) who may have been involved in the cartel. This study employs 2 exogenous changes—cartel busting and binding board gender quotas policies—to examine their impact on board gender composition using DiD and Staggered DiD methods. In countries with binding quotas, boards are already undergoing restructuring to include more women, even without the shock of cartel busting. Furthermore, boards increase the percentage of women in non-cartelized firms only when countries introduce binding gender quotas. Binding board gender quota regulations are effective in improving gender balance on corporate boards. Additionally, in countries without binding board gender quotas, only firms sanctioned for cartel conduct show an increase in the percentage of women after cartel busting, compared to non-sanctioned firms. Thus, board gender quota regulations and anti-cartel policies interact to influence the gender composition of sanctioned firms: binding gender policies are effective in achieving more balanced board gender composition, and cartel busting drives more balanced boards in sanctioned firms regardless of whether their countries have binding board quota regulations or not