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Article

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Accepted version

Publication date

2020-01-09

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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/199083

Expert deference about the epistemic and its metaepistemological significance

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https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2019.46

Abstract

This paper focuses on the phenomenon of forming one's judgement about epistemic matters, such as whether one has some reason not to believe false propositions, on the basis of the opinion of somebody one takes to be an expert about them. The paper pursues three aims. First, it argues that some cases of expert deference about epistemic matters are suspicious. Secondly, it provides an explanation of such a suspiciousness. Thirdly, it draws the metaepistemological implications of the proposed explanation.

Subject

Teoria del coneixement, Objectivitat

Subject (English)

Theory of knowledge, Objectivity

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Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)

Citation

PALMIRA, Michele. Expert deference about the epistemic and its metaepistemological significance. Canadian journal of philosophy. 2020. Vol. 50, num. 4, pags. 524-538. ISSN 0045-5091. [consulted: 16 of August of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/199083

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