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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/221037
When developers hold office: shaping housing supply through local politics
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We examine the impact of city council members with real estate backgrounds on housing supply in California 1995-2019. Using candidate occupation data and a close-elections regression discontinuity design, we find that electing a developer increases approved housing units by 68% during their term. This effect fades after one term, suggesting developers influence zoning decisions more than long-term policy change. Analysis of votes extracted from council meetings shows they are especially effective in securing discretionary zoning approvals. Importantly, we find no evidence of electoral backlash, suggesting voters are generally supportive of housing expansion led by pro-development candidates.
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OUASBAA, Ghizlen, SOLÉ OLLÉ, Albert and VILADECANS MARSAL, Elisabet. When developers hold office: shaping housing supply through local politics. IEB Working Paper 2025/05. [consulted: 9 of October of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/221037