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IEB10-44_Egger+Kotthenbuerger.pdf (501.56 KB)

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Working paper

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2010

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cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Egger et al., 2010
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116863

Electoral rules and incentive effects of fiscal transfers: evidence from Germany

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Abstract

The impact electoral rules and fiscal equalization programs have for local públic finance are separately analyzed in the literature. This paper empirically analyzes whether legislator elected under different rules respond differently to changes in fiscal incentives. Using a reform of the electoral rule and the equalization system as a natural experiment, we find that municipalities which elect legislators under proportional rule react less strongly to changes in fiscal incentives.

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Eleccions, Administració local, Federalisme, Dret fiscal

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Elections, Local government, Federalism, Tax law

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IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers

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EGGER, Peter, KOETHENBUERGER, Marco and SMART, Michael. Electoral rules and incentive effects of fiscal transfers: evidence from Germany. IEB Working Paper 2010/44. [consulted: 16 of October of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116863

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