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Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116863
Electoral rules and incentive effects of fiscal transfers: evidence from Germany
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The impact electoral rules and fiscal equalization programs have for local públic finance are separately analyzed in the literature. This paper empirically analyzes whether legislator elected under different rules respond differently to changes in fiscal incentives. Using a reform of the electoral rule and the equalization system as a natural experiment, we find that municipalities which elect legislators under proportional rule react less strongly to changes in fiscal incentives.
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EGGER, Peter, KOETHENBUERGER, Marco, SMART, Michael. Electoral rules and incentive effects of fiscal transfers: evidence from Germany. _IEB Working Paper 2010/44_. [consulta: 29 de gener de 2026]. [Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116863]