Electoral rules and incentive effects of fiscal transfers: evidence from Germany

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dc.contributor.authorEgger, Peter
dc.contributor.authorKoethenbuerger, Marco
dc.contributor.authorSmart, Michael
dc.date.accessioned2017-10-20T12:37:20Z
dc.date.available2017-10-20T12:37:20Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.description.abstractThe impact electoral rules and fiscal equalization programs have for local públic finance are separately analyzed in the literature. This paper empirically analyzes whether legislator elected under different rules respond differently to changes in fiscal incentives. Using a reform of the electoral rule and the equalization system as a natural experiment, we find that municipalities which elect legislators under proportional rule react less strongly to changes in fiscal incentives.ca
dc.format.extent30 p.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/116863
dc.language.isoengca
dc.publisherInstitut d’Economia de Barcelonaca
dc.relation.isformatofReproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions
dc.relation.ispartofIEB Working Paper 2010/44
dc.rightscc-by-nc-nd, (c) Egger et al., 2010
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessca
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.sourceIEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers
dc.subject.classificationEleccionscat
dc.subject.classificationAdministració localcat
dc.subject.classificationFederalisme
dc.subject.classificationDret fiscalcat
dc.subject.otherElectionseng
dc.subject.otherLocal governmenteng
dc.subject.otherFederalism
dc.subject.otherTax laweng
dc.titleElectoral rules and incentive effects of fiscal transfers: evidence from Germanyca
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperca

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