Tipus de document

Article

Versió

Versió publicada

Data de publicació

Llicència de publicació

cc-by-nc-nd (c) Martinez Merino, 2019
Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/171173

Deception as cooperation

Títol de la revista

Director/Tutor

ISSN de la revista

Títol del volum

Resum

I develop a rate-distortion analysis of signaling games with imperfect common interest. Sender and receiver should be seen as jointly managing a communication channel with the objective of minimizing two independent distortion measures. I use this analysis to identify a problem with 'functional' theories of deception, and in particular Brian Skyrms's: there are perfectly cooperative, non-exploitative instances of channel management that come out as manipulative and deceptive according to those theories.

Matèries (anglès)

Citació

Citació

MARTINEZ MERINO, Manuel Jesús. Deception as cooperation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences. 2019. Vol. 77, num. 101184. ISSN 1369-8486. [consulted: 27 of June of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/171173

Exportar metadades

JSON - METS

Compartir registre