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2019-07-17

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cc-by-nc-nd (c) Martinez Merino, 2019
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/171173

Deception as cooperation

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Abstract

I develop a rate-distortion analysis of signaling games with imperfect common interest. Sender and receiver should be seen as jointly managing a communication channel with the objective of minimizing two independent distortion measures. I use this analysis to identify a problem with 'functional' theories of deception, and in particular Brian Skyrms's: there are perfectly cooperative, non-exploitative instances of channel management that come out as manipulative and deceptive according to those theories.

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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2019.101184

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Teoria de la informació, Comunicació

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Information theory, Communication

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MARTINEZ MERINO, Manuel Jesús. Deception as cooperation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences. 2019. Vol. 77, num. 101184. ISSN 1369-8486. [consulted: 10 of October of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/171173

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