Deception as cooperation
| dc.contributor.author | Martinez Merino, Manuel Jesús | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-10-13T10:40:47Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2020-10-13T10:40:47Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2019-07-17 | |
| dc.date.updated | 2020-10-13T10:40:47Z | |
| dc.description.abstract | I develop a rate-distortion analysis of signaling games with imperfect common interest. Sender and receiver should be seen as jointly managing a communication channel with the objective of minimizing two independent distortion measures. I use this analysis to identify a problem with 'functional' theories of deception, and in particular Brian Skyrms's: there are perfectly cooperative, non-exploitative instances of channel management that come out as manipulative and deceptive according to those theories. | |
| dc.format.extent | 7 p. | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.identifier.idgrec | 694198 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1369-8486 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/171173 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | |
| dc.publisher | Elsevier | |
| dc.relation.isformatof | Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2019.101184 | |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 2019, vol. 77, p. 101184 | |
| dc.relation.uri | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2019.101184 | |
| dc.rights | cc-by-nc-nd (c) Martinez Merino, 2019 | |
| dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es | |
| dc.source | Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia) | |
| dc.subject.classification | Teoria de la informació | |
| dc.subject.classification | Comunicació | |
| dc.subject.other | Information theory | |
| dc.subject.other | Communication | |
| dc.title | Deception as cooperation | |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
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