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2023-04-19

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cc-by (c) Botín, Marcelino, 2023
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/217263

Russellian Physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong

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Russellian physicalism is becoming increasingly popular because it promises to deliver what everybody wants, realism and physicalism about consciousness. But Russellian physicalists are not the first to swear on “the promise”, standard TypeB physicalism is a less fanciful view that also claims to give everything and take nothing. In this paper, I argue that our hopes should not be placed on Russellian physicalism because, unlike Type-B physicalism, it cannot explain how phenomenal concepts can reveal the nature of phenomenal properties without weakening its physicalist credentials. The revelation challenge shows that Russellian physicalism is either committed to an anti-realist and self-defeating view of phenomenal concepts or it is physically unacceptable.

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https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-01955-1

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Consciència, Cognició, Ment i cos

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Consciousness, Cognition, Mind and body

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BOTÍN SANZ DE SAUTUOLA GARCIA, Marcelino. Russellian Physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong. Philosophical Studies. 2023. Vol. 180, num. 7, pags. 1829-1848. ISSN 0031-8116. [consulted: 9 of October of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/217263

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