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Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/217263
Russellian Physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong
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Russellian physicalism is becoming increasingly popular because it promises to
deliver what everybody wants, realism and physicalism about consciousness. But
Russellian physicalists are not the first to swear on “the promise”, standard TypeB physicalism is a less fanciful view that also claims to give everything and take
nothing. In this paper, I argue that our hopes should not be placed on Russellian
physicalism because, unlike Type-B physicalism, it cannot explain how phenomenal
concepts can reveal the nature of phenomenal properties without weakening its
physicalist credentials. The revelation challenge shows that Russellian physicalism
is either committed to an anti-realist and self-defeating view of phenomenal concepts or it is physically unacceptable.
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BOTÍN SANZ DE SAUTUOLA GARCIA, Marcelino. Russellian Physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong. Philosophical Studies. 2023. Vol. 180, num. 7, pags. 1829-1848. ISSN 0031-8116. [consulted: 16 of August of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/217263