Files

679723.pdf (268.23 KB)

Document type

Article

Version

Accepted version

Publication date

2018

All rights reserved

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/121263

Pay for Performance with Motivated Employees

Journal Title

Authors

Director/Tutor

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Related resource

https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2017-0190

Abstract

Heterogeneity in intrinsic motivation affects the optimal contract offered to employees in teams. Under individual incentives, the effort exerted by both motivated and selfish employees is distorted. This distortion is mitigated if employees receive a wage based on team performance. As a result, the principal prefers to use team incentives, while motivated employees are better off with individual incentives.

Subject

Motivació del personal, Incentius laborals, Selecció de personal

Subject (English)

Employee motivation, Incentives in industry, Employee selection

Citation

Collections

Articles publicats en revistes (Economia)

Citation

CERRONE, Claudia and MANNA, Ester. Pay for Performance with Motivated Employees. The BE Journal Of Economic Analysis & Policy. 2018. Vol. 18, num. 1, pags. 1-8. ISSN 1935-1682. [consulted: 7 of June of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/121263

Export metadata

JSON - METS

Share record