Pay for Performance with Motivated Employees
| dc.contributor.author | Cerrone, Claudia | |
| dc.contributor.author | Manna, Ester | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-04-04T15:45:30Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2019-12-31T06:10:12Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2018 | |
| dc.date.updated | 2018-04-04T15:45:30Z | |
| dc.description.abstract | Heterogeneity in intrinsic motivation affects the optimal contract offered to employees in teams. Under individual incentives, the effort exerted by both motivated and selfish employees is distorted. This distortion is mitigated if employees receive a wage based on team performance. As a result, the principal prefers to use team incentives, while motivated employees are better off with individual incentives. | |
| dc.format.extent | 8 p. | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.identifier.idgrec | 679723 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1935-1682 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/121263 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | |
| dc.publisher | Walter de Gruyter | |
| dc.relation.isformatof | Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2017-0190 | |
| dc.relation.ispartof | The BE Journal Of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2018, vol. 18, num. 1, p. 1-8 | |
| dc.relation.uri | https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2017-0190 | |
| dc.rights | (c) Walter de Gruyter, 2018 | |
| dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
| dc.source | Articles publicats en revistes (Economia) | |
| dc.subject.classification | Motivació del personal | |
| dc.subject.classification | Incentius laborals | |
| dc.subject.classification | Selecció de personal | |
| dc.subject.other | Employee motivation | |
| dc.subject.other | Incentives in industry | |
| dc.subject.other | Employee selection | |
| dc.title | Pay for Performance with Motivated Employees | |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion |
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