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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/154486
Sneaky Assertions
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Some speech acts are made indirectly. It is thus natural to think that assertions could also be made indirectly. Grice's conversational implicatures appear to be just a case of this, in which one indirectly makes an assertion or a related constative act by means of a declarative sentence. Several arguments, however, have been given against indirect assertions, by Davis (1999), Fricker (2012), Green (2007, 2015), Lepore & Stone (2010, 2015) and others. This paper confronts and rejects three considerations that have been made: arguments based on the distinction between lying and misleading; arguments based on the ordinary concept of assertion; and arguments based on the testimonial knowledge that assertions provide.
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GARCÍA-CARPINTERO, Manuel. Sneaky Assertions. Philosophical Perspectives. 2018. Vol. 32, num. 1, pags. 188-218. ISSN 1520-8583. [consulted: 15 of August of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/154486