Document type
Bachelor thesisPublication date
Publication license
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/184727
Lògica intuïcionista. Teorema de Glivenko
Journal Title
Authors
Director/Tutor
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Related resource
Abstract
[en] Glivenko’s theorem says that the fact that a proposition is provable in classical logic is equivalent to the double negation of this proposition being provable in intuitionistic logic. We present the intuitionistic logic and introduce two syntactic calculus: the Hilbert calculus and the natural deduction calculus. We give as well two semantics for the intuitionistic logic. A relational one, based on Kripke models and an algebraic one, based
on Heyting algebras. To conclude we give three different proofs of Glivenko’s theorem. A syntactic one, a semantic one based on Kripke models and a semantic one based on Heyting algebras.
Description
Treballs Finals de Grau de Matemàtiques, Facultat de Matemàtiques, Universitat de Barcelona, Any: 2021, Director: Joan Gispert Brasó
Subject (English)
Citation
Collections
Citation
CANAL FERRER, Genı́s. Lògica intuïcionista. Teorema de Glivenko. [consulted: 7 of June of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/184727